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This study attempts to provide a description and analysis of the
international trade in consumer electronics products between four newly
industrialized countries in east Asia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Korea1 (the Four) and the rest of the world. The recent rise of the Four
as major participants in international trade, marketing their increasingly
sophisticated products, has attracted much attention. The developed world,
in its role of consumer, has welcomed their products with prodigal gusto.
At the same time, competitors in the developed world have bemoaned and
resisted the loss of their markets. The underdeveloped world has viewed
the promotion of its erstwhile fellow-sufferers as a success story to admire
and a model to emulate. Even countries under communist party rule seem
willing to tear a page or two from the Four's notebook.
Rapid rises in consumer electronics exports have been among the
most visible characteristics of the Four's development. Although consumer
electronics is by no means the most important sector in their economies,
its_ international trade role has been greater than its size in the domestic
economies would lead one to expect. Moreover, it has achieved consider
able symbolic importance. Consumer electronics.. goods are there for all
to see, buy, and use. Their quality and sophistication, which all may
judge, have been highly important in dispelling the view of Asian products
as substandard. In this study, by comparing and contrasting consumer
electronics trade flows and suggesting reasons for their development and
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character, the writer hopes to bring into sharper focus one aspect of these
remarkable countries' progress.
Definition of "Consumer Electronics"
The electronics industry is distinguished from the electrical appli-
ance industry in that the former's products are based on the modulation of
the flow of electrons in vacuums, low pressure gases or semiconductors
in order to achieve desired signals, whereas the latter's products simply
use electron flows as power sources. The modern electronics industry,
based primarily on semiconductors,- owes its greatest debt to transistor,
invented in 1947. Since then the industry has grown very rapidly. Today,
it is usually divided into three categories, consumer electronics, industrial
electronics and electronic components. Of these three categories, consumer
electronics ranks third in terms of value of production.2
Among the products grouped under consumer electronics are tele-
vision sets, radios, digital watches, phonographs, tape recorders, calcu-
lators, television games and personal computers. New products are added
every year to this rapidly developing industry, a fact which complicates the
kind of research this study attempts. For this reason, the study will confine
itself primarily to the more established products: radios, TVs, tape recor-
ders, phonographs and electronic calculators. Attention will be paid as well
to some aspects of the components trade, for its development is often insepa-
rable from that of the Four's consumer electronics industry.
3Why the Four?
The reader may wonder why the Four were selected for this study.
Why was Japan not included? Or, on the other end of the spectrum, why
were Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, etc., excluded?
Japan, some would argue, blazed the trail which Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong
and Singapore have followed. Notwithstanding the validity of this observation,
Japan's post-war recovery was achieved under conditions much different from
those under which the Four have advanced. Today, Japan has more than a
century of rapid industrialization to look back on. The Four, at most, have
a half a century of fitful industrialization (the case of Taiwan) and less than
a quarter of a century of rapid growth behind them. Furthermore, Japan
possessed the skills, domestic market size, and determination to pursue
an independent, closed policy of recovery, basing modernization on imports
of unbundled technologies. The Four, on the other hand, have welcomed
substantial foreign participation in building their economies. The exclusion
of other newly industrialized and industrializing countries from this study is
justified by their poorer progress relative to the Four, as well as by the
fact that they do not share certain historical, social and political common
experiences which the Four do share.3
Sources of Information
The core of the study is based ,on an analysis of trade statistics pub-
lished by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
4and the Hong Kong and Singapore governments, as well as industry publica-
tions and related monographs. The reason for using several sets of trade
statistics is that the national statistics provide much finer product break-
downs, while the OECD statistics have the advantage of uniformity. Further.
more, national statistics provide a look at the Four's intra-regional trade.4
Organization of the Study
The remainder of this study is divided into four chapters. The first
presents a theoretical overview of approaches to description and explanation
of consumer electronics trade patterns. The second describes common and
divergent country-specific characteristics of the Four which have contributed
to their export-led boom. The third describes important events in the Four's
electronics industries in the late sixties and seventies. The final chapter pre-
sents summary descriptions of the Four's changing trade flows with the OECD,
and presents some of the study's conclusions. The statistical appendix con-
tains the trade statistics upon which many of the study's conclusions are
based.
Chapter I: Footnotes
Throughout this thesis term Taiwan is used to refer to the Republic
of China on the island of Taiwan after 1949. Korea, as used in the thesis,
refers to the Republic of Korea or South Korea.
1978 Electronics Industry Data Book, U.S. Department of Commerce,
1978, p. 2. The relative importance of the categories in the United States to¬
day is shown by the percent of annual factory sales made up by each:
consumer electronics
communications equipment 30.4%






In fact, the Four's experiences are divergent, as will be brought
out in Chapter III. Specifically, many scholars have paired Singapore's
with Hong Kong's experience Csee Theodore Geiger, Tales of Two City
States (Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1973)3 and
Korea's with Taiwan's Csee Aid that Works: Guns and Butter, The
Economist, 222:508+ (11 February 1967) n In terms of electronics indus¬
try development, Singapore does not fit well with the other three. Among
those who support the grouping of the Four as adopted in this thesis are
Ian M. D. Little see Ian Little An Economic Reconnaissance, Economic
Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan, edited by W. Galenson (Ithaca,
N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979) from whom I adopted the term
the Four and M. McAbee see M. McAbee, Asia's Economic Gang of
Four, Industry Week, 200:44-5 (5 February 1979) One article typical
of those wishing to extend the grouping to other east Asian countries was
published in Electronic News on 13 November 1972, entitled Malaysia,
a new Hong Kong of the Far East.,
Throughout this study, the term region is used to mean the
Four considered as a group and the term intra-regional to mean
between the Four. As one conclusion reached in Chapter IV demon¬
strates, this is mainly a semantical convenience. Significant trade does
not exist to support its use in an economic sense, nor can its exclusion
of other proximous countries be justified in a geographical sense.
II. Theoretical Approaches
Two approaches usually are taken to explain patterns of world trade.
Thitheoretical approach-seeks to fit observed facts into consistent theories,
developing new theories when the old ones no longer can decently clothe the
facts. The eclectic approach tailors ad hoc theories to each different body
of facts. This chapter will discuss the problem of the Four's consumer
electronics trade flows according to the former method.
Trade theory handles easily a world where goods are traded freely,
where factors of production are bound by the borders of countries and where
markets are efficient. With minor difficulties, it can cope with numerous
trade distortions produced by governments, industries and inefficient markets.
It serves rather less well in dynamic situations where political, social and
cultural externalities override the importance of economics in markets whose
boundaries fail to correspond with international frontiers.••
What the theories provide are methods by which the deluge of trade
data can be channelled and interpreted. Moreover, the eclectic tailoring
approach, which I personally favor, draws heavily on conventional trade
theory, often without acknowledging that it is doing so. To avoid this sin,
this paper will look first at the theories.
The Heckscher-Ohlin Model of Factor Proportions
This model predicts that, given the international constancy of pro-
duction technologies, countries will specialize in the production for export
7of those commodities whose factor proportions reflect the producing coun-
try's factor endowments. Countries will export products embodying their
abundant resource and import products embodying their scarce resources.
The four resources generally found to be significant are capital, labor,
skills, and natural resources. 1
Usually, consumer electronics products are assumed and/or proven
to be labor intensive, and the Four are found to be labor abundant, relative
to their trading partners. 2 This theory has been tested for various countries.
Korea has been shown to exhibit a reverse form of the Leontiff Paradox: its
total exports are more capital intensive than its imports. This reversal is
explained by the large proportion of labor-intensive agricultural products
among its imports. When only manufactured goods are considered, Korea,
in fact, does exhibit the expected behavior: it exports labor-intensive goods
and imports capital-intensive goods. j3 In his study of the trade between Korea
and Japan, Lee Tai young has demonstrated that the exports to Japan of
Korean electrical machinery are more labor-intensive than imports of the
same category of goods from Japan.4 Although., no studies have been pub-
lished regarding Hong Kong and Singapore, one would expect that they would
exhibit even more strongly the Korean reversal, since they rely even more
heavily on imported agricultural products.
The same trend exists in Taiwan, although not strongly enough to
produce a reversal. Maurice Scott's research on Taiwanese value-added
shows that, for all commodities, the value-added per employee is only
8
marginally higher for imports.than for exports. In contrast, his other
manufactures "category (i. e., all manufactures excluding food, drink and
tobacco) show over 30 percent higher import value-added than export value-
added. If food, drink and tobacco are included, the difference is even
greater. 5
One fault of the Heckscher-Ohli.n model as formulated above-is its
two-country abstraction whereby the home country's exports are compared
with imports from the rest of the world. This violation of reality would
pose little problem for countries at the extremes of factor endowments.
Clearly, however, the Four are middle economies, with trading partners
well below as well as well above them in allocations of labor, capital and
skills.
A study of trade proportions by Kuo- shu Liang and Ching-ing Hou
Liang gives strong evidence to support this intuitively appealing dualistic
concept of Taiwanese trade. They found that exports to developed countries
have a markedly lower fixed assets per worker ratio, and a somewhat
lower skill ratio than exports to underdeveloped areas. 6 One can apply
their conclusion to the other economies with which this- study deals, ex-
pecting them to produce labor intensive goods for the developed world
and skill and capital intensive goods (relatively speaking) for the under-
developed nations.
Even when the model takes the above qualifications into considera-
tion, however, it still falls short of explaining the patterns of trade observed.
9If the measure of labor abundance is to be the cheapness of labor, and if
that is the factor of prime importance in determining the location of the
industry, then why are consumer electronics industries not present in all
countries of the world with cheap labor? Not only are the Four's wage
rates not low by underdeveloped standards but, as Table II. 1 shows, they
have been climbing rapidly in precisely the same period when exports of
consumer electronics goods have been rising. Obviously, other factors
are at work.
One factor which provides considerable confusion is the degree of
skill intensity in the product. Product classifications mask real differences
in the sophistication of products: a radio is still a radio whether it be a
cheap three transistor model, the labor intensive product of a cottage indus-
try, or a high quality multi-band model, the product of considerable techno-
logical inputs. Another complication is the extent to which factor intensities
change over time within a single product. Table II. 2 shows how calculators,
formerly labor intensive, have become more RD and capital intensive
(i..e., shown by the increasing overhead). This, trend would tend to shift
the comparative advantage away from the Four, unless their skill and
capital resource allocation increases were able to..offset the shifting factor
intensities of the product.
The large role which multinational corporations (MNCs) play in
carrying out international trade presents further complications for the
Heckscher-Ohlin model. One could argue that the MNCs merely facilitate
Table II. 1
Hourly Wages in the Four
(in U.S.$ per hour)
Year Singapore Hong Kong** Korea*** Taiwan****


















































































Sources; Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics for Asia and the Pacific hourly
wages for industrial workers, translated at end-of-year rates.
**ibid. Daily wages for industrial workers divided by nine to
convert to hourly wages and translated at end of year exchange
rates.
Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations monthly wage rates
of industrial workers, including salaried employees, with wages
in kind and family allowances included divided by 200 to convert
to hourly wages and translated at end-of-year rates.
****Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China monthly wa g e s
for electrical workers divided by 200 and translated at end-of-
period rate (1969-1972); miscellaneous industrial workers divided
by 200 and translated at end-of-period rate (1973-1976); The
1977 statistic is for electronics assembly workers quoted in TV
Competition that Won't Go Away Business Week, 8 May 1978,
p. 86
Note: With the exception of Taiwan's 1977 figure, the statistics above
overstate the wages of an electronics assembly worker, who is
typically a young female paid
average.
a wage below the industrial
The columns are not completely compatible. Korean hourly indus¬
trial wages are considerably overstated due to the inclusion of
salaried employees and benefits. In the article Korea, Land of
the Rising Yen” Electronic News, 17 December 1973, electronics
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Table II.1, Hourly Wages in the Four (cont'd.)
industry wages are given as $20 to $30
per month or 0.10 to 0.15 per hour on
a 200 hour month. Also see Alan Lee's
article "Electronics, a Raiidly Growing
Industry" Hong Kong Trader, Vol. 6, 1979
which states that Korea's and Taiwan's
wages in,the industry were both about
two thirds of Hong Kong's, but that, for
four years, the gap has been narrowing.
Table 11. 2
Factor*Intensities of Electronic Calculators
(in% allocation of total cost)
Year Labor Components Overhead
1964 35 53 12
1966 31 54 15
1969 25 59 16
1971 16 66 18
1973 13 64 23
1975 10 65 25
Source: B.A. Majumdar, Innovations, Product Development and
Technology Transfer: An Empirical Study of Dynamic
Competitive Advantage, The Case of Electronic Calcu-
lators (unpublished dissertation, Case Western Reserve
University, 1977), p. 121.
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the transfers of factors of production embodied in their products. To do
so, however, would be to overlook the unique character of the MNC's
ability to avoid markets in making intra-corporate decisions to achieve a
global rationalization of its activities. Not only can it transfer capital and
skills, a violation in itself of the original factor proportions theory, but it
also can exert and exploit its oligopolistic power.
In his study of offshore production in less developed countries,
R. W. Moxon notes
The main barrier to a Taiwanese corporation
producing for the North American market
was undoubtably not technological (although
this was of some importance)., but rather
market access. In would have taken a Tai-
wanese corporation several years to convince
U. S. customers for auto radios that it was a
reliable source of supply. Without the presence
of the American name on Taiwan's products,
market penetration would have been much slower.
The MNCs possess, at the very least, unique marketing skills and advan-
tages o The Heckscher -Ohlin model handles well neither the multinationals'
multinationality nor their marketing strength. Marketing is the tip of the
iceberg of demand, a problem which the model skirts by assuming domestic
and foreign demand to be described by sets of indifference curves. In the
unlikely event that such curves could be documented for a country, their
shapes would be observed to be changing constantly. The model, however,
is at a complete loss as to explain and predict how they change.
7
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Vernon's Product. Cycle Model
Demand plays a central role in the product cycle model, which
plots successive stages of product development, production, exports and
imports as a function of time. The theory states that a new product will
be developed and mass produced first in the country which provides the
most favorable marketing opportunities, even when that country differs
from the country where the invention takes place. In short, traditional
factor costs are assumed to be of less importance than marketing costs.
Although Vernon, in his original model, assumed that the U. S. with its
vast affluent market, would always be the place of new product develop-
ment, he later conceded that other countries might be first.
The model predicts that during the early stages of product develop-
ment, demand is price-inelastic and domestic consumption accelerates.
As the rate of domestic demand increase slows down, exports to less
advanced countries take up some of the expanding industry's capacity.
The product gradually matures, demand levels off and becomes price
elastic and profit margins decrease. At the same time, less advanced
countries' rapidly growing. productive capacity begins to displace the advanced
country's exports in the less advanced countries' markets and, subsequently,
trading on its lower costs, begins to penetrate the advanced country's mar-
kets with its own exports. Successively less advanced countries follow the
import-production-export sequence as successively newer products are
developed by the advanced country.
14
The model seems to offer a neat approach to explaining the march
of consumer electronics goods' production sites from the U. S. and Europe,
to Japan, and now the newly industrialized countries. Furthermore, it is
not opposed to the Heckscher-Ohlin model: it merely restricts its operation
to mature products where costs of production become more important than
costs of marketing.
An indirect test of the model, as applied to the Taiwanese electronics
industry, was carried out by Gerstenfeld and Wortzel. Their interviews with
Taiwanese companies' executives led them to the conclusion that demand-pull
innovations are more successful than technology-push innovations. They also
concluded that more than 50 percent of relevant information came from personal
contact.8 These conclusions lend support to viewing market contact as a factor
of paramount importance in product development.
In the absence of an internationally efficient market, and with national
markets functioning reasonably efficiently, product cycles would be expected.
The presence of MNCs, providing media for international intra-corporate
transfers of information and marketing of products, could be expected to
foreshorten and, sometimes, short-circuit the normal cycles. In this way,
offshore production could be incorporated into the model.
Yet problems with the model persist. Product differentiation is
crucial to the interpretation of the model, but what constitutes a new pro-
duct is not always clear'. A transistor radio produced in 1954 was undoubt-
.. ably a new product despite the fact that radios had been around for more than
15
30 years. But is a combined clock radio with a cassette deck and liquid
crystal display a new product in a world familiar with clock radios, liquid
crystal displays and radio-cassette tape recorders?
Once the definition of a new product has been decided, testing the
theory presents additional problems. Typically, trade data is presented
in highly aggregated industry and product groupings, which include both
new and old products. )'ruly new products, which warrant whole new cate-
gories, usually wait several years for the new categories to.be created. In
the meantime, valuable data is lost. These problems notwithstanding, pro-
duct cycles have been applied to entire industries with interesting, although
difficult to interpret, results.
A more fundamental problem with the model is that it is determinis-
tic and thus produces few guidelines for practical decision-making. It makes
no mention of how long the technology lags are. It simply states that coun.-
try x follows country y in the development of products pl, p2, P3.9 etc. It
permits neither that x will develop a product specifically to be sold in y, nor
that x will be able to develop p2 before it is fully standardized precisely because
the lack of standardization.precludes application of capital intensive production
technologies. Both of these phenomena, however, have been exhibited by the
Four with and without the direct participation of MNCs.
The successful integration of the electronics industry into a relatively
.efficient world market has led Majumdar to dispute the validity of the nation
16
as the main reference for analysis of world trade. He feels that the elec-
tronic calculator industry should be analyzed at the micro-level, in terms
of competitive advantages of firms, not in terms of comparative advantages
of nations or in terms of national sequential acquisition of productive capa-
bilities. 9 The market is still the central theme, but no simple progression
of levels of advancement seem to be able to explain market access.
The Wild Geese Flying Pattern Mode 10
Neither of the previously mentioned models tackles the problem of
national economic development in terms of patterns of international trade.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model is essentially static. Vernon's product cycle
model involves a predetermined march of new products through progressively
less developed countries. Country ranking is implicitly constant. The wild
geese flying pattern model, developed by K. Akamatsu in 1937 is primarily
concerned with national development.
Having studied the textile industries in England and Japan, Akamatsu
described their changing pattern's of imports and exports as overlapping cycles
(which look a bit like Vernon's later product cycles, but which reminded
Akamatsu of migrating flocks of geese,in V formation with different flocks,
I'Vs overlapping each other). For each industry, the cycles describe first
the rise of imports, then the rise of domestic production, and finally the rise
of exports. He hypothesized that, for developing countries, the overlapping
cycles of consumer goods industries would be proceeded by increasingly
17
sophisticated industries with the final cycles describing the rise of tech-
nology and capital rich capital equipment.
Besides being aesthetically pleasing, the model does describe the
process of development which Japan went through in the early-to-mid
twentieth century. It also describes some of the import-production-export
sequences which the Four have been going through. Furthermore, the model
deals with whole industries, and thus is easier to test than Vernon's. Yet
the model suffers from familiar defects: it is deterministic and says nothing
about the speed of development. It only describes, in very broad terms, how
development will occur. While it is a useful descriptive tool and while it may
offer the developing countries a degree of hope often lacking in the dismal
science, it gives little explanation of why such events occur.
The foregoing discussion has attempted to provide a few broad theo-




1This review of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the following re-
view of Vernon's product cycle model are adapted from John F. Morrall,
III, Human Capital, Technology and the Role of the United States in Inter-
national Trade (Gainsville, University of Florida Press, 1972), Chapters
1 and 2.
2Korea, just prior to the export boom exhibited the most striking
labor glut. In the late 1950s, Korea was a desperately poor country yet,
from 1960 to 1966, wages in real terms dropped more than eight percent
while returns to labor in manufacturing fell from 39. 6% in 1963 to 28.4%
in 1965. Parvez Hasan and D. C. Rao, Korea, Policy Issues for Long
Term Development (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1979),
p. 21.
3Ibid., pp. 249-Z50.
4Lee Tai Young, The Trade Relationship Between Japan and Korea
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1975), pp. 49-50.
Lee calculated the factor coefficients for bilateral exports of electrical
machinery as follows:
man-yearscapital
0.391.40 mn.Japan (per mn. output)
1.21W1. 08 mn.Korea (per mn. won output)
5Maurice Scott, Foreign Trade, Economic Growth and Structural
Change in Taiwan, edited by Galenson, pp. 357-3580
bKuo-Shu Liang and Ching-ing Hou Liang, Exports and Employment
in Taiwan, Conference on Population and Economic Development in Taiwan
(Taipei, Academia Sinica, Institute of Economics, 1976) cited by Maurice
Scott, op. cit., p. 54.
Richard W. Moxon, Offshore Production in the Less Developed
Countries, a Case Study in Multinationality: The Electronics Industry,
The Bulletin (New York, New York University, Graduate Institute of Busi-
ness Administration, Institute of Finance, 1974), p. 74.
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8A. Gerstenfeld and L.H. Wortzel, Strategies for innovations
in Developing Countries, Sloan Management Review, 19:57-68 (Fall,
1977).
9Majundar, Innovations, Product Development and Technology
Transfer: An Empirical Study of Dynamic Competitive Advantage, The
Case of Electronic Calculators (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Case
Western Reserve University, 1977).
10The review of Akamatsu's model is taken from a short reference
by Ken C. Y. Liu, Industrial Development and Changes in the Structure of
Foreign Trade: The Experience of the Republic of China in Taiwan, IMF
Staff Papers, 15:290-321 (November, 1968), p. 307, and a detailed explana-
tion of the model by Mr. William Rapp in two lectures on the Japanese
economy given at New York University: The Shifting Structure of Industry
and Employment in Modern Japan (21 February 1980) and The Theory and
Development of the Japanese Firm (28 February 1980).
III. The Four
The theories outlined in Chapter II have suggested several descrip-
tions of and reasons for the success of the export-led development of the
Four's consumer electronic industries. As noted above, however, they
fall short of providing full explanations and, at times, their premises and
predictions are violated by the facts. This chapter will turn to the specific
cultural, social, economic and political factors leading to the Four's export
boom. The factors are grouped so as to illustrate the similarities between
the developments of each of the countries under study. Within each grouping,
however, the country-specific experience of each of the Four will be con-
trasted with the others. The six groups of factors to be discussed are:
Political stability and social cohesion1.
Elasticity and reliability of labor supplies,2.
The Confucian heritage3.
High degrees of social flexibility
Reduction of alternatives to trade and
6. Sound government policies.
1. Political Stability and Social Cohesion. The minimum require-
ment demanded by prospective investors looking for profitable returns on
their capital is the assurance that their investments are not likely to be
swept away by the tides of political and/or social change. One way or
another, the Four have provided that assurance.
Cultural homogeneity helps lower the risks of social conflict. Basic




Kong, which is 99 percent Chinese, even the non-Cantonese speaking
minorities consider themselves to share a single cultural identity. The
same holds true in Taiwan, where descendants of non-Han original inhabi-
tants claim a common heritage with the descendants of post-sixteenth century
immigrants from Fujian Province and the post-1949 refugees from various
parts of the mainland. Korea presents even less cultural diversity than Hong
Kong or Taiwan.
In contrast, Singapore is tri-cultural. The native Malays form about
15 percent of the population Indians make up about seven percent and Chinese
make up an overwhelming 76 percent. Nevertheless, civic solidarity has been
assiduously cultivated with, it appears, a great deal of success.
Like the other three, Singapore's internal cohesiveness has been
strengthened by external threats which fostered a seige mentality. In the late
fifties, Singapore was admitted with reluctance into the Federation of Malaysia,
only to be expelled from it in the early sixties. Simultaneously, Indonesia
embarked on a policy of confrontation with Singapore, alleging that it was an
imperialist creation. Finally, with that threat receding, the withdrawal of
British forces East of Aden seemed to provide another danger to the city
state's military and economic security. On top of these problems, racial
tensions in the sixties provided another challenge.
Lee Kuan Yew's appeals for social discipline to cope with adversity
found enough, sympathetic response among the citizens to give him a free
hand in crushing the communist opposition (whose help was invaluable to
22
him in achieving power some ten yea s before), and in instituting sound
economic and social policies. Asai esult, a cohesive, puritanical, hard-
working society has grown out of the irmoil.
External threats to Taiwan an Korea have been used validly and
effectively to stimulate popular suppcet for national reconstruction and
military preparedness. The externa: threat, moreover, justifies the one-
party regimes and the use of whateve force is necessary to preserve an
unusual degree of government stabili
In Hong Kong, cohesion is acl ved in spite of the mild but persis-
tant popular antipathy towards coloni rule. The reason is simple: the
people know that the government is best alternative available. The only
time the antipathy has broken out intc riolence in the recent past was in the
Star Ferry riots of 1967, which can b ascribed, with equal validity, to the
spillover effects of the Chinese Cultual Revolution. In lieu of any identifi-
cation with the political entity, there gists a civic consensus that Hong
Kong is just a place to make money. The widespread appreciation of the
fact that China shares in that consens is helps maintain confidence in the
colony's stability. Although the clich that Hong Kong is borrowed land
existing on borrowed time is often reseated, the government continues to
be one of the oldest in Asia today. W h Hong Kong, as with the rest of the
Four, increasing prosperity and upwa d social mobility provide outlets to
potentially destructive social tensions m.nd legitimize the rather un-democratic
system of government.
23
Z. Elasticity and Reliability of Labor Supplies. In the 1960s, the
Four all possessed cheap, abundant supplies of labor. In the electronics
industry, a great degree of elasticity was achieved by virtue of the fact
that the industry prefers to hire women, who were not traditionally a part
of the urban work force. Due to other factors, however, Korea, Taiwan
and, to a certain extent, Hong Kong have benefitted from greater elastici-
ties of labor supplies than Singapore. All four have benefitted from unusually
calm labor relations.
Korea and Taiwan both have densely populated countrysides. In Korea
where agricultural productivity has been increasing at a decreasing rate, the
rural population has continued to rise and is expected to do so until the year
1990.1 The government has implemented policies to support agricultural
prices so as to offset the growing urban-rural income disparity, and stem
the flow of migrants from the countryside into the city slums. For these
reasons, Korea's labor reserve promises to continue to provide benefits
for the country in the foreseeable future, although not without steadily
increasing costs. The government of Korea has contributed to labor stability
by guaranteeing the right to unionize but denying the right to strike, and pro-
2
viding binding arbitration in cases of labor-management disputes.
Taiwan's pattern of urbanization has differed from the centralization
found in Korea's cities. Recently, Taiwan's rural reserve labor force has
been engaging heavily in non-agricultural activities. By 1972, -fifty percent
of the rural population viewed agriculture as a sideline. Many industries
24
are located in the countryside, while workers commute from their farms
to others in nearby cities. In times of industrial prosperity, the rural
population engages.more in industrial pursuits in times of economic ad-
versity, they revert to agriculture. With its smaller population and more
prosperous countryside, Taiwan is likely to experience labor shortages
before Korea but, to date, the government has succeeded in keeping raises
even with if not below Korea's (see Table II. 1). Taiwan has labor legisla-
tion pertaining to collective bargaining and health and safety standards to
3
which large firms must adhere. Since most manufacturing firms have less
than 2*0 employees, however, they are exempt, a fact which marks Taiwan's
labor relations with informality and intimacy.4
Hong Kong's elastic labor supply has been more problematic.
Throughout the fifties and into the early sixties, the city state drew into her
workshops millions of refugees from the People's Republic of China. In the
early and mid seventies, the influx was all but stopped by the Chinese, but
since then, it has again grown sporadically. A large number of people in
neighboring Guangdong Province wish to migrate to the rich metropolis of
Hong Kongo The only effective regulators of the migratory flow are the
authorities and border guards of the People's Republic of China. Thus, the
elasticity of Hong Kong's labor supply is market-determined only in the
very long run.
The situation as it stands today is more than a little threatening to
Hong Kong's standard of living, yet recent developments hold out new hopes.
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Under Chinese government sponsorship, many Hong Kong firms recently
have set up branch plants in Shenzhen, the county of Guangdong which bor-
ders on Hong Kong's New. Territories. The plants' location gives them
access to cheap Chinese labor for labor intensive production processes.
Capital, parts, machinery and expertise come from Hong Kong. 5 The
increase in Guangdong's prosperity in the long run may relieve migration
pressures while, in the short run, the growth of such schemes effectively
will increase Hong Kong's labor supply.
Although Hong Kong's law guarantees the right to unionize and strike,
labor activity has been very low. The reasons lie in the high mobility of the
labor force and its distrust of leftist organizations. In all likelihood, though,
as Hong Kong's economy stabilizes at a developed country's level, and as
labor mobility is reduced, labor activity will rise.
Singapore, with the lowest population of the Four, also has the least
elastic labor supply. Although unemployment was a'problem in the late six-
ties, that situation was short-lived. Wages in Singapore have consistently
been the highest of the Four. To some extent, elasticity is introduced by
the availability of guest workers from Malaysia6 but company reliance on
guest laborers is not looked on with favor by the government or most of the
citizens, because of fears of rekindling racial tensions.
Labor problems seldom occur in Singapore because the National
Trades Union Congress, representing about 92 percent of unionized labor,
has very close ties with the ruling People's Action Party. As provided by
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the Employment Act of 1968, unions bargain with management for three-
year contracts subject to government arbitration in cases of dispute. Unions
have no right to bargain over promotions, transfers, employment, dismissal,
retrenchment or reinstatement.
3. The Confucian Cultural Heritage. All of the Four share a common
Confucian heritage which lays emphasis on the importance of education and self-
improvement. Traditionally, knowledge, demonstrated in the imperial exami-
nation systems, was supposed to be the key to entrance into, if not advancement
through, the Chinese and Korean government bureaucracies. Confucian tradi-
tional society was no more democratic than modern industrial organizations.
Its cultural norms supported beneficent heirarchy by exhorting its members
to fulfill their allotted social roles to the best of their abilities. Cultivation
of proper relationships between inferiors and superiors, and between those
of equal rank were the social activities deemed most important. Far from
focusing on the transcendental, Confucian doctrine was oriented towards
perfecting observable behavior in contemporary society. In fact, many
scholars contend that it was not a religion at all. Religion or not, it has
shaped a culture whose members are remarkably literate, industrious
and orderly.
4. Social Flexibility. New societies, free from entrenched bureau-
cracies, strict class divisions and vested interests, and characterized by
social mobility, stand a better chance of growing and adapting to the modern
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world than do more rigid societies. All of the Four have experienced great
traumas in the recent past, which have given them clear sites on which to
build their new societies.
Korea emerged from World War II virtually unscathed, but peace
divided the country in half and disposed of its fifty year old colonial adminis-
tration. Then, in 1950, Korea became the victim of one of the most.savage
wars of modern history. The war left Korea with a destroyed infrastructure,
7
over a million and a half war dead and hundreds of thousands of refugees.
8
One positive factor emerged: the society was malleable.
Taiwan was more damaged by allied bombing in World War II than
Korea. Taiwan's loss of its Japanese colonial administrative and business
class was followed, five years later, by the arrival of a Chinese ruling elite,
one and a half million mainlanders--businessmen, officials and military per-
sonnel- -for whom life under a communist regime would have been intolerable.
Since..they shared with the islanders a common culture, their assumption of
power was not particularly obnoxious. Furthermore, they were determined
not to repeat the errors which had led to defeat on the mainland. In any case,
they lacked the connections with local power holders which would have made
the repetition of those errors likely.
Hong Kong, under Japanese occupation, dwindled to a virtual ghost
town during World War II. Its modest post-war population recovery was
accelerated rapidly in the early fifties by huge influxes of mainland Chinese
refugees. Thus, the malleability and upward mobility of Hong Kong society
has been that of an immigrant society..
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Singapore suffered stagnation under the Japanese, but sustained
neither significant property damage nor great population losses. Never-
theless, as a society of new immigrants9 which only recently has achieved
full independence, Singapore too has demonstrated great social flexibility.
Destruction of old social and political orders, decolonization, and
immigration have been experiences common to much of the third world.
The effects of such social traumas allow the restructuring of societies and
the release of energies to a degree not possible in more' stable societies.
If the opportunity is not taken, however, or if it is mistaken, the release
of those new energies, will be counter-productive, Because the Four have
enjoyed high degrees of stability after their traumas, because they have
shown remarkable adaptability to industrial discipline, and because of
numerous other interrelated factors, social flexibility induced by trauma
has been a positive factor useful in broadening perspectives, increasing
initiative, and stimulating growth.
5. Reduction of Alternatives. It can be argued cogently that the
Four were as much pushed into producing for international markets as they
arrived there by design. All four are maritime nations, facing out onto the
rest of the world. All four were directed away from' their -natural hinter-
lands, first by long periods of colonization by foreign trading nations, and
then by political events beyond their control. Unable to pursue insular poli-
cies, they turned themselves into aggressive producers and traders for
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international markets.
Following the communist victories in mainland China, Korea and
Taiwan were thrust into the U. S. Pacific defense perimeter, and supplied
with aid sufficient to maintain their military role in it. They were also
supplied with free American advice on how to run their economies at a time
when the U. S. was the free trade advocate of the world. 10 Aid not only pro-
vided the capital to allow them to enter into international trade it also pro-
vided the push.
Both Hong Kong and Singapore, seeing their traditional entrepot roles
undermined, turned to manufacturing as the only way out. As city states with
small domestic markets, they were forced to think internationally. The seven-
ties have seen the revival of Singapore's entrepot trade and, with the reopening
of China, the eighties may do the same thing for Hong Kong. Be that as it may,
the fact remains that circumstances have changed their roles from being traris-
shippers to being producers as well.
Hong Kong's colonial administration, in true nineteenth century liberal
fashion, never considered any policy but free trade. Singapore, Taiwan and
Korea tried and found wanting the policy of producing mainly for domestic
markets. More will be said about the Four's trading policies below.
6. Government Policies. Despite differing degrees of economic plan-
ning, protection and incentives, the Four, have all benefitted from consistently
synergistic government relationships with business. Policies of all four have
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stimulated domestic business, attracted foreign capital and,- in three of
the Four, have given direction to development. Unlike the case in many
developed and developing countries, the Four have gone a long way towards
achieving public -private sector harmony, similar in spirit but not in form
to Japan's. Briefly, the Four's policies have developed as follows:
Korea
1. Participation in Economic Development. Of the Four, Korea has
the government most active in economic planning. The public sector accounts
for 15 percent of the gross domestic product with state investment making up
28 percent of all investments. 11 All sectors of the banking industry either
are owned or are controlled tightly by the state.
Since 1962, Korea has carried out a series of five-year state plans
which project economic output targets. The targetting serves to designate
sectors of the economy which should be given priority. Implementation of
the plan is achieved through control of foreign exchange and import licenses.
The fact that the Economic Planning Board also controls the budget gives
additional strength to the plan. Plans have been exceeded in every case,
and their flexibility has been remarkable. Since they conform so willingly
to market dictates, one should conclude that Korea's is not, in effect, a
centrally planned economy, in spite of the presence of apparatus which
could make it. so. The most significant role which planning plays is to
force the government to perform complete reviews of the economy. These
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reviews tend to improve the quality of decisions as to which sectors of the
economy should receive attention. Korea's overall targets for 1986 are to
make machinery Korea's major export while rising to number one in world
exports of textiles and increasing production of electronics, ceramics and
12
non-ferrous metals.
Z. Tariff Policies and Export Incentives. Korea simultaneously
has pursued policies of import substitution and export penetration and, in
the process, has accumulated an extremely complex tariff-incentive struc-
ture in a very short time. As part of the import substitution policy, a total
ban was imposed on imports of electrical appliances and radios in 1960.
Although radio manufacturing doubled in Korea over the next year, it was
soon realized that the domestic market limitations would make the import
13
substitution boom peter out if exports did not assume industry leadership.
Export incentives, in the form of soft, long-term loans, government guaran-
tees on loans for exporters and importers of raw materials and semi-finished
goods destined for processing and re-export, government underwriting, and
technical and managerial. assistance were introduced in the 1960s, 14
In light of these tariff and incentive complexities,. considerable dis-
agreement exists as to the net effect of the government's policies. That
those effects are far-reaching is not in dispute: exports were subsidized
to the extent of one third of their domestic value in 1970. 15 Even with the
recent scaling down and rationalizing of the system, it still is formidable.
Kuznets feels that its net effect is an undesirably inefficient allocation of
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resources. 16 Hason and Rao disagree, saying that the subsidies merely
offset the tariff and currency exchange rate supports of the domestic mar-
ket, creating conditions not far removed from export participation in inter-
national free trade. 17
3. Foreign Investment Incentives. President Park's commitment
to attracting international capital was demonstrated first in his conclusion
of the highly controversial peace treaty with Japan in 1965. The resigna-
tion of the opposition in protest was another step in the establishment of
one-party rule, while the almost immediate influx of Japanese capital
coincided with the beginning of the foreign-financed export-led industrial
boom. It was not until 1970, however, that Japanese capital inflows out-
paced American. 18 The policy of stimulating foreign direct investment
was extended in 1974 by the establishment of export processing zones and
bonded warehouses on the Taiwanese model. 19 The Koreans have relied
heavily on borrowing to sustain growth and take the place of discontinued
U o S. aid.
The government has done much to create a. climate favorable to
iTiternational investors. Although it prefers joint ventures with local
participation, it allows 100 percent foreign ownership in the electronics
and other high technology or capital intensive industries.20 Incentives
to attract foreign firms include five year exemptions from taxes applying
to corporations and incomes of foreign personnel, import duty exemptions
on capital goods, availability of low interest loans and guarantees of rights
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to repatriate dividends from the first year of operations and principal from
the thir do 21
Taiwan
1. Participation in Economic Development. Once it became apparent
to the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China that their strategic re-
treat to Taiwan was a long-term if not a permanent move, attention was turned
towards building a strong economy. Starting in 1953, the government began
a series of four-year plans. More so than in the case of Korea a decade later,
Taiwan's plans were closer to reviews of the state of the economy, defences
of fiscal policies, and projections of the future, than they were attempts to
acquire central control of the economy.
Government planning was most evident in the 1950s land reform,
which gave land to the tiller, thereby reducing the gross inequalities of the
previous rural social structure and assuring rural stability. Today, govern,
ment planning is apparent in efforts to increase synthetic fiber production,
to promote electronics R & D and to accelerate the shift into capital and skill
intensive production modes.
The government owns and operates certain vital sectors of the econom'
such as the electric power and petroleum industries. In the opinion of Ian
Little, however, the government's greatest contribution has been the restraint
it has shown in lowering the proportion of public consumption of the gross
national product. 22 Owing to the relatively large number of industrial
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establishments taken over by the government from the Japanese, the public
sector accounted for over 50 percent of gross national product in 1952, but
it has since been reduced to just over 15 percent in 1975.23 Taiwan's fis-
cal and monetary conservatism is reflected in its .anti-inflation programs
which have been highly successful since 1960.
Z. Tariff Policies and Export Incentives. From 1953 to 1956, the
government pursued a classic import substitution policy. The policy was
successful, at least in terms of developing the domestic electric appliance
and electronics industries, as well as many other industries which would
later boom as exporters. But, as would be the case in Korea almost a
decade later, the import substitution policy proved to be limited by the size
of the domestic market. From the late fifties, while not dropping its domes-
tic protection, Taiwan initiated its export stimulus policies. The New Taiwan
Dollar was devalued in 1958 and 1961 the multiple exchange rate system was
dismantled application procedures for import licensing were simplified and
tariffs were lowered significantly. In 1960, the Statute for Encouragement
of Investment was passed. This statute gave tax incentives for the production
of preferred commodities, the export of goods, and the establishment of new
industries.
The net effect of these policies was to put the exporter on the inter-
national footing of a free trader. He is rebatted for all import duties on
capital goods,, raw materials and parts. Or he can buy the import substitutes
at world prices from suppliers in the protected domestic industry. The local
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supplier then applies for a rebate for the amount of the import duties which
would have been paid the government had those same products been imported.
These policies, applied to international investors became the basis for export
processing zones and bonded warehouses.
As is the case with Korea, Taiwan recently has yielded to pressure
to dismantle some of its trade walls. Although the pre-1973 import tariff
revisions had no noticable effect on revenue collected, since that date, tariff
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revenues have dropped significantly.
3. Foreign Investment Incentives. Nineteen-sixty saw the strengthen-
ing of foreign investment incentive schemes in Taiwan. The success of the
new legislation led to a rapid increase in inflows of foreign capital, most of
which initially came from overseas Chinese. Z5 In 1965, Taiwan established
its first export processing zone at Kaohsiung. The idea behind the export
processing zones and the bonded warehouses was to provide a free trade area'
drawing on local labor and whatever local materials and parts could be used
economically, but able to import freely raw materials and semi-finished
goods., and export semi-finished goods or finished goods without going
through the administrative complications of the rebate system alluded to
above. Initially, foreign investment incentives were .designed to increase
employment as well as aiding the balance of payments and transferring
technology. With the achievement of full employment and balance of pay-
ments surpluses, however, government incentives have been applied more




The Hong Kong government's policy with respect to business, trade
and foreign investment is one of the simplest in the world. There are vir-
tually no tariff controls on imports26 no government incentives to export.
Salaries, corporate profits, interest and property all are subject to maxi-
mum 15 percent tax after certain deductions. Funds can be transferred into
and out of the colony.with no government interference.
The government does deviate from classical laissez-faire principals
by providing public housing for over half the colony's population, some basic
social welfare programs* and, on a strictly profit-making basis, public trans-
port. The new industrial estates, too, have been established on the basis of
their profitability. Hong Kong stands as a tribute to classical liberal econo-
mic thought: benign neglect of the government has provided a climate very
conducive to growth, domestic prosperity, foreign investment and interna-
tional trade.
Singapore
1. Participation in Economic Development. In its economic policies,
Singapore ranks midway between Hong Kong on one hand and Taiwan and Korea
on the other. The Singapore government makes no overall development plans:
As in Hong Kong, the government's largest economic pursuit is housing half
the city state's population. Through the Economic Development Board,
established in 1961, the Singapore government does take an active role
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promoting investment, developing industrial estates and providing infant
industries with government financing.
2. Tariff and Export Incentives. Singapore went through a period
of pursuing an import substitution policy when it was in the Malaysian
Federation. ,Political divorce from Malaysia turned attention outwards,
and Singapore became a free port. Today, like Hong Kong, Singapore allows
the import and export of goods and capital on an unrestricted basis. The
Export Incentives Act of 1967, which gives tax breaks to exporters, together
with a system of export credits, increase the competitiveness of Singapore's
products abroad.
3. Foreign Investment Incentives. Incentives for foreign investors
are confined to tax breaks and help in locating industrial estates. Preferen-
tial treatment accorded to labor intensive industries, which was common in
the late sixties, was discontinued by November, 1970 due to the achievement
of full employment. 27 Now the government is interested in attracting invest-
ments in the skill-intensive industries and is actively discouraging those
investors who seek only cheap labor. Under the Capital Assistance Scheme
of 1975, foreign as well as domesticfirms are able to drawon a fund administered by the EconomicDevelopmentBoardto secure equity capital, loans and
loan guarantees for investment in industries upgrading the technology and
28
labor skills of Singapore. Electronics is among the industries eligible.
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This chapter has suggested some of the conditions common to
the Four which have made the rapid development of export-led consumer
electronics industries possible. The study now turns to the development
of the industries themselves.
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The seven industries eligible for Capital Assistance Scheme aid
are metal engineering and machinery, shipbuilding and transportation equip¬
ment, electrical and electronics products, ship machinery and fittings,•
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IV. Development of the Four's Consumer Electronics Industries
This chapter consists of a country by country description of the
main events in the development of the Four's consumer electronics in¬
dustry, followed by a short description of the intra-regional trade from
Hong Kong's perspective.
Korea
1. Domestic Development. Korea's domestic consumer electronics
industry dates from 1958, the first year tube radios were manufactured there.
The next year saw the initiation of transistor radio production. Under import
substitution policies, the industry grew rapidly to supply domestic markets.
Radio assembly for domestic and export sales grew into a thriving cottage
industry which survives down to the present. Larger domestic firms have
gone into more sophisticated products.
2. Offshore Component Production, In sharp contrast to the majority
of domestic firms are the large 100 percent foreign owned firms mass produc¬
ing components (mostly semiconductors) for export. Most of the American
firms entered the market from 1965 to 1970 1 by which time they exported
about 70 percent of Korea's electronics exports. In 1979 components com¬
prised about 82 percent of the electronics industry's exports but that figure
dropped to 72 percent in 1972 and to 6 1 percent in 1973. Even though the
trend in the 1970s has been away from 100 percent foreign owned subsidiaries,
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they have continued to play a very important role in Korea's international
trade in electronics goods, made more important by Korea's balance of
payments problems.
3. Joint Ventures and the Japanese Investment Boom. Japanese
investments also increased rapidly after 1965 but their form differed sub-
stantially from American investments. The Japanese participated mainly
in joint ventures with domestic firms to produce finished products, the most
important of which were TVs, for export to Japan and the rest of the world.4
The Japanese companies moved offshore to offset increased costs of labor,
yen revaluation and domestic pollution controls. No doubt, they also wished
to gain access to the domestic Korean market which they accurately predicted
to be rapidly growing.
As Korean government policy shifted from encouraging all foreign
investments which employed Koreans, to encouraging those which would
transfer desired technologies and participate with local firms in joint ven-
tures, official preference swung towards the Japanese type of investment.
Japan's proximity and close ties with its former colony were factors no less
important to Japan's rapid displacement of the U.S. Is leading investor role.
Were it not for strong anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, Japan's role in the
economy probably would be even greater than it is today.
By the middle of 1973, 87 foreign-owned electronics firms were
working in Korea. Forty-nine of them were joint ventures and 56 of them
involved Japanese investors, while only 27 of them involved U. S. firms.
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Of the 58 licensing agreements in effect in the electronics industry in
Korea that year, only ten were with U. S. firms. 5
4. The TV Export Boom. Korea's exports of TVs began in 1971
and increased at a rate of 200 percent per year through 1973 with the vast
majority of sets going to the U. S. 6 The production boom was made possible
through licensing agreements and joint ventures7 while the successful pene-
tration of the U. S. market owes much to the marketing agreements concluded
with U. S. distributors. 8 In May 1972, Electronic News confidently predicted
that Korean color TV production was three years away pending testing of
Korean color telecasting. 9 Less than a year and a half later, Korean color
TVs flooded onto the international markets.
The most successful of the domestic electronics companies, Samsung,
used joint ventures and licensing agreements very extensively. Prior to 1973,
under a joint venture with Nippon Electric and a licensing agreement with
Mitsubishi, Samsung was Korea's leading exporter of black and white TVs.
When Korean color TV exports started in 1973, Samsung elected to wait' a
year-so as to acquire a fully integrated production'capacity before exporting.
Other firms were using around 35 percent Japanese components. 10 Samsung
wanted all its own. It established a picture tube joint venture with Nippon
Electric, a picture tube bulb joint venture with Corning, and a TV parts
joint venture with Sanyo. 11
Color TV broadcasting had been expected in Korea since 1974, but
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it had not started until 1980. Thus, throughout the export boom which has
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continued until 1978, with a slight pause for the 1974-1975 recession,
the Korean color TV industry was producing virtually entirely for foreign
consumption. Moreover, they were doing so on the basis of their own
initiative, and not as an MNC offshore sourcing location.
Korean TVs proved to be a little too competitive for U. S. industry.
In late 1978, the U. S. government succeeded in convincing the Koreans to
accept an orderly marketing agreement to limit the number of TVs which
Korea could export to the U. S. from May 1979 to May 1980.
5. Calculators and Semiconductors. The Korean calculator boom
of 197214 was achieved primarily through the use of Japanese technology
and parts. Only one Korean firm began exports of a domestically developed
line sponsored by the government, but they did so in the face of strong com-
petition. 15 The late seventies saw the government increasing its commitment
to developing Korea's technological capabilities through its plans to establish
a full domestic semiconductor industry. 16
Taiwan
1. Early Growth. Taiwan's electronics industry was established
long before Korea's, with exports dating back to 1956. The domestic indus-
try, which grew up in the late fifties and early sixties, was largely based on
assembly of imported parts. Rapid growth in the mid-sixties under the
impetus of foreign investment and export incentives added a new dimension
17
to the electronics industry, without displacing the domestic industry.
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Z. U. S. Offshore Production. In 1964, General Instruments became
the first U. S. electronics company to invest in an offshore production facility
in Taiwan for the production of components. From then through the early
1970s the major U. S. consumer electronics manufacturers set up facilities
to assemble TVs and radios and to produce the labor intensive components
for American assembly. The huge influx of U. S. investment allowed the
industry to surge ahead from 1964 through 1973, a decade in which the Indus-
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try's annual growth rate never dropped below 40 percent.
Initially, offshore production in Taiwan consisted of importing virtually
all parts from the U. S. Taiwan supplied the cheap labor, and the finished or
semifinished products were reexported. The U. S. firms benefitted on one
hand from partial duty exemption under U. S. trade tariff items 806. 30 and
807, and on the other hand from the export processing zones and investment
incentives provided by the Taiwanese.
These benefits proved particularly applicable to TV production for
the U.S. Is surging demand. By the end of 1971, Westinghouse, Admiral,
Motorola, RCA, Philco Ford and Zenith were all exporting black and white
sets back to the U. S., and many were considering color production.- 19
Taiwan was exporting almost $71 million worth of TVs annually, of which
$68 million was bound for the U.S. 20 The predominance of purely offshore
production, however, proved to be a passing phenomenon, and by 1973, U. S.
21
investments in Taiwan were already tapering off.
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3. Rising Local Production of TVs and TV Components. The Tai-
wanese government's regulation that components of domestically produced
TVs be 60 percent and 80 percent locally produced after 1967 and 1971
respectively was intended to help stimulate the development of a strong
22
domestically self-sufficient consumer electronics industry. More help
in that direction was acquired by the revaluation of the Japanese yen, which
sent the prices of popular Japanese TVs soaring about 15 or 20 percent in
1972, 23 The offshore plants, too, finding domestic parts sourcing to be
more cost efficient than importing everything from the U. S., began to shift
their policies. By 1972 Admiral, which previously had imported all of its
parts from the U.S., was using 60 percent Taiwanese components, and
planned to raise that proportion to 100 percent, 24
The largest domestic electronics company, Tatung, provides a good
example of the industry's rapid progress. Tatung has imported'much of its
technology through licensing agreements with Japanese firms. Z5 Its estab-
lishment of a subsidiary in Los Angeles in 1973 for the purpose of marketing
indicates its recognition of the U. S. as its prime market. 26
4. Calculator Production. Three Taiwanese firms started production
of calculators in 1972. Two, Tonguan and Unitron used Texas Instruments'
chips and the third, Tatung, used chips supplied by a local U. S. subsidiary.
By the end of 1972, Tatung had concluded a.technology transfer and assembly
agreement with Kawasaki by which semi-finished calculators from Japan
would be processed in Taiwan. The understanding provided that, in future,
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full manufacture and assembly would be done locally.27
5. Developing Semiconductor Technology. The Taiwanese govern-
ment, wishing to hasten the acquisition of the kinds of technologies Tatung
was pursuing with its agreement with Kawasaki, sponsored the establishment
of an RD company under the direction of engineers and scientists of Chiao
Tung University, Fine Products Manufacturing Corporation. The company
set up a plant to develop, fabricate and test integrated circuits for use in
televisions, automobiles, watches and .telecommunications apparatus, 28
Four years late, RCA was contracted by the Industrial Research Institute
to build a large scale integration integrated circuit research facility. Z9
That project was followed, in 1978, by another turnkey contract with RCA.
This time, the Taiwanese contracted for the building of a metallic oxide
sillicon integrated circuit plant capable of producing three million chips
per year.- Rather than continue to depend on their ultimate competitors
for parts, the Taiwanese were opting to strengthen their own capacity. 30
6. The Recession, Price Hikes and Orderly Marketing Agreements.
Taiwan suffered steep declines in exports during the 1974-1975 recession.
Picture tube manufacturers were hardest hit because effects of Japanese
dumping on the U. S. market compounded the reduction in demand due to
the recession.31 The oil price hikes sent costs rising 10 to 15 percent,
but local manufacturers, faced with demand reductions of 30 to 50 percent,




Although, following the recession, Taiwan was the leader in black
and white TV exports to the U.S., its color TV export capacity was late in
arriving. Colorcasting had begun in 1971 and several Taiwanese firms
were licensed to. produce for the domestic market, but only Hitachi was
exporting color TVs from Taiwan in 1977.33 Restrictions on Japanese
color TV entry into the U. S. in the Orderly Marketing Agreement between
Japan and the U. S. led to a short boom of Taiwanese exports of color TVs
to which the American producers were not slow to react.
Negotiating the Orderly Marketing Agreement with Taiwan was much
more difficult than the concurrent negotiations with Korea, because of the
large role components from U. S. owned subsidiaries played in the total
volume of TV exports. When the Taiwanese finally did agree to the U. S.
conditions, it was under time pressures exerted by the U. S. decision to
drop recognition of Taiwan in favor of the People's Republic of China. The
effect of the agreement, signed in late December, 1978, has been to force
the Taiwanese to diversify their markets and increase flexibility in their
U. S. marketing operations. 34
Hong Kong
1. Patterns of Early Development. Unlike Taiwan and Korea, Hong
Kong was unable to develop its domestic consumer electronics industry behind
trade walls, nor has it received any government support. It was founded in
the fifties and sixties using two sources of capital: the first, starting in the
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fifties, was Chinese capital which, highly geared with bank loans, went to
set up small radio and electronics assembly plants the second, starting in
the sixties, was U. S. capital which went to set up 100 percent owned subsi-
diaries producing electronic components. In fact, Hong Kong was the first
large American base for electronics sourcing in East Asia. In 1969, it
supplied a total of more than 18 percent of U. S. imported tubes and transis-
35
tors, a proportion which has steadily declined to less than six percent in 1977.
2. Transistor Radios. Hong Kong is second only to Japan in world
production of transistor radios. 36 Since the consumer electronics industry
first started in Hong Kong, they have formed its backbone. Although in re-
cent years their share of consumer electronics exports has dropped below
70 percent at the beginning of the seventies they comprised over 98 percent. 37
Tables IV. 1 and IV. 2 illustrate the shifting flows of imports to and
exports from Hong Kong of transistor. radio parts. Initially Hong Kong opera-
tions consisted of assembling Japanese parts and shipping them, either com-
pleted or partly assembled, to the U. S. 38 Since then, many Japanese labor-
intensive parts manufacturing processes have left Japan and are now performed
by` the Four. Other members of the Four, the U. S. and Japan still provide
almost all of Hong Kong's parts,, as they did in 1968, but Japan's share has
dropped to about 50 percent with most of the difference taken up by Taiwan.
As for parts exports, Hong Kong now.fills part of the role of labor-
plus -skill -intensive parts exporter previously filled by Japan. Increasing
proportions of the colony's transistor radio parts go to a variety of third
Table IV. 1 Hong Kong's Imports of Transistor Radio Parts


























































































Table IV. 2 Hong Kong's Exports of Transistor Radio Parts



































































Note: Exports refer only to domestic exports and do not include re-exports.
Source: Hong Kong Trade Statistics.
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world countries who perform the more laborious tasks of assembly. This
change can be observed in the reduction of market share of parts exports
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which Japan, the U. S. and the other three receive (see Table IV. 2).
3. New Products in the Seventies. The story of Hong Kong's
electronics industry in the seventies has been one of great success, in the
face of profit squeezes on transistor radio production, through rapid diver-
sification into new lines of products. Hong Kong's flexibility in adapting to
market trends has been apparent in its- shift from calculators into digital
watches in 1976 and subsequently into video and computer games.40 The
magnitudes of such shifts are difficult to determine owing to the time lag
between the appearance of a new product and its entry into a separate cate-
gory in the trade statistics. For example, it was observed in 1977 that one
category of toys doubled due to the TV games boom. 41 Such rapid shifts in
production have led to problems in obtaining liquid crystal displays, speakers,
and chips in recent years.42 But besides creating such problems, the shifts
also indicate unique strengths. William Beazer observed
Making watches requires at least $10 million
in inventory and fairly complicated machinery.
In addition, labor accounts for only about twenty
percent of the assembly cost of a good digital
watch. And labor savings tend to be offset by
the cost of importing components from the
United States and shipping the completed watches.
Therefore much of the explanation must lie in mar-
keting and an ability to respond to a rapid increase
in demand.43
Contrary to what the product cycle theory would lead one to predict, Hong
Kong. has developed this international marketing ability.
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Singapore
1. Simple Radios. Singapore reflects the same general dichotomy
in the electronics industry as does Hong Kong: the majority of firms are
small, producing such low-technology goods as transistor radios, while
the larger foreign-owned firms produce components and some finished
products for the international market. Radios have not held the degree of
dominance which they have in Hong Kong, but they have shown the same
declining trend in recent years. They accounted for a third of exports of
finished consumer electronics products in 1978, down from about two thirds
in 1973.44
2. Foreign Investments and the End of Cheap Labor. The exporting
electronics industry in Singapore really began in mid- 1968 when a few U. S.
electronics companies set up semiconductor factories to take advantage of
the cheap labor and tax breaks. Two years later, those tax breaks ended
for new labor seeking entrants, 45 Among the entrants to the Singapore
labor market was Philips, which set up a facility to produce TVs for the
European market, and Hitachi.
After a decade of slowly rising wages, the National Wage Council
in 1979 called for a wage increase to all electronics workers of 23 percent,
with the explicit object of shaking out the electronics and electrical assem-
bly industries. This action is part of the governments policy to move Singa.-
pore into more skill-intensive aspects of production.46
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The Intra-Regional Parts Trade
One of the original objects of this study was to analyze the chang-
ing role of the electronics parts trade among the Four. Lack of data has
restricted this analysis to the Hong Kong perspective with some additional
comments regarding Singapore. With some reservations, the conclusions
suggested here can be extended to the other two.
Table IV. 3 and IV. 4 show the intra-regional trade in consumer
electronics parts of Hong Kong and Singapore respectively expressed as
percentages of their trade in parts with the world. Hong Kong shows a
rapid rise in the proportion of intra-regional trade from just over 15
percent in 1968 to 34 percent in 1973, with slow declines thereafter to
just over 26 percent in 1977 and 1978. The trend for Singapore from
1973 to 1978 is also one of decline. A few hypotheses will be extended
to explain these shifts.
Factors Leading to the Increased Importance of the Trade
1. The development of complete electronic industries. Initial stages
in the development of the region's consumer electronics industries were con-
fined to assembly of developed countries' parts (notably, Japanese radio parts
in the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore and the U.S... and Japanese TV parts
in the cases of Taiwan and Korea). As backward linkages increased local
capacity to produce components, extra-regional parts trade tended to decline.
For Hong Kong and•Singapore, which lacked large protected domestic markets,
local sourcing would, in many cases be intra-regional sourcing.
Table IV. 3 Hong Kong Parts Trade with Taiwan, Singapore and Korea








































































Source: Hong Kong Trade Statistics, exports+ imports for categories
724109, 724207, 724208, and 891129.
Table IV, 4 Singapore Parts Trade with Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan





































Source: Singapore Half-Yearly Trade Statistics, exports+ imports,
for categories 724109, 724209 and 891112.
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2. Complementary intra-regional development. According to the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade will develop to the extent to which factor
endowments differ (assuming identical indifference curves). In the absence
of import and export controls, sourcing of labor intensive parts would tend
to move away from domestic production to areas of cheaper labor costs.
Thus, intra-regional trade should also be a function of the intra-regional
wage differentials. As Table II. 1 showed, wage differentials between Hong
Kong and Singapore, on one hand, and Taiwan, on the other, widened to 1973
and narrowed thereafter.
3. Parallel intra-regional development. The extent to which coun-
tries within the region are producing the same products with interchangeable
parts would also bear on trading volume.
Factors Leading to Declining Importance of the. Trade
4. Global integration. Regional ties would tend to break down as
economies of scale and global logistics planning increase. Global integration
is likely to be directly related to the degree of MNC involvement in the trade.
5. Rise of other competitive suppliers. As other countries, parti-
cularly nearby Southeast Asian countries, develop their electronics produc-
tion capacities, their lower costs of labor would tend-to divert parts sourcing
of the Four away from the region.
Changing Patterns of Trade Flows
Throughoutthe period from 1968 to 1973, factors 1, 2, and 3 were
probably of overriding importance. After 1973, factors 4 and 5 most likely
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became more important.
Tables IV. 3 and IV. 4 demonstrate that the concept of a regional
trading zone made up of the Four is, at best, a shaky one. Hong Kong
demonstrates strong ties with Taiwan and Singapore's trade with Hong
Kong and Taiwan has not been inconsequential, but at no time does Korea
figure prominently in the trade. Furthermore, the concept of a region
of the Four ignores the role of Japan, whose trade links with Korea are
exceptionally strong and whose role in Hong Kong and Singaporean sourc-
ing is still leading. As factor 5 suggests, other nearby countries, like
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia are likely to invalidate
increasingly as time goes on, the concept of a region of the Four. In short,
the Four possess common developmental experiences, but the spillover into





1 Prior to 1970, the following U. S. companies had 100% owned
subsidiaries operating in Korea:
ProductCompany
transistorsFairchild Camera and Instruments
Signetics Corp. integrated circuits (ICs)
transistors ICsMotorola




Source: 1970-1971 issues of Electronic News.
2Seoul Brothers, Electronic News, 30 November 1970.
3uKorea Pins Hopes for' Export Trade on Electronics, "Electronic
News, 17 December 1973.
4One notable exception to this generalization was Toshiba's subsidiary,
Korea's sixth largest electronics exporting company in 1972 (after Motorola,
Signetics, Korea Micro, and Control Data). Toshiba was engaged in making
transistors for the Japanese market. Land of the Morning Calm, Electronic
News, 8 May 1972.
5"Korean Industry Production: Exports Rise, " Electronic News,
4 June 1973.
6See statistical appendix.
r The following is a list, compiled from Electronic News articles,
of joint venture agreements and licensing agreements which facilitated the
technology transfers so essential to Korea's emergence as a world leader
in the consumer electronics industry. Note that only two of the joint ven-
tures are with U. S. companies.
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Nature of AgreementKorean Company Foreign Company
joint venture: TV bulbsSamsung Corning
: calculatorsSamsung. Cas sio
joint venture: TVs, tape re-Samsung-Sanyo Sanyo
corders, calculators
joint venture: color TVsSamsung-NEC Nippon Electric
joint venture: calculatorsKorea Morrel ISE of Japan
license: TVs, calculatorsTai Han Electric Toshiba
technical agreement: calculatqDong Nam Sharp
joint venture: color TVsAnam Matsushita
color TVsSai Han JV C
Wha s hin color TVsSony Toshiba
calculatorsInternational Data Sharp
color TVsCrown Radio of JapanCrown Radio
Kumi Varadyne Varadyne joint venture: ICs
kfu11 nature of agreement not indicated
8The following is a list, compiled from Electronic News articles,
of some of the Korean-U. S. inter-company marketing agreements which
made the rapid penetration of the U. S. market by Korean consumer elec-
tronics products possible.
Korean Company U. S. Companies Product Year
Gold Star Olympic TVs 1972,
Chunil 1972Escor, BMP,. Ross Radios
Samsung-Sanyo Lloyds, Morse, K-Mart TVs 19 72
Sears, Baylor, MGA
Samsung-NEC 1972TVs
Electro -Voic e Stereos 1972Audio Wholesale (Royal)
of Korea Olson Packard (Teledyne)
International Electrovoice, Teledyne Stereos 1973
Korea Electronics
9 Land of the Morning Calm, 11 Electronic News, 8 May 1972,
1USay Toshiba, Matsushita Eye Parts Plants in Korea, Electronic
News, 5 November 1973.




South Korea Colorcasting Due to Begin, Electronic News,
19 August 1974 Taiwan Steps Up Color TV Exports Role, Electronic
News, 7 November 1977.
13Quite likely, no pause occurred in color TV exports from Korea
to the U. S. during the recession. All TV exports, however, dropped about
40°%o in 1975 before recovering in 1976. See statistical appendix.
In one year, exports jumped from a starting year export value of
$53, 000 to $2, 000, 000 in 1972. Since then, only in one year (1974) has
Korea's calculator exports exceeded its 1972 export volume. See statisti-
cal appendix.
15The company, producing the calculators developed by the Korean
Institute of Science and Technology, was Minsung Electronics. Korea
Carving Out Niche as Calculator Exporter, Electronic News, 29 October
1973.
16 Korea Weighs Computer Manufacture, Electronic News, 19
February 1979 Korea Allots $60M for IC RD Output, Electronic News,
22 October 1979.
17 At least from the point of view of the 'electronics industry, the incentiv
were highly effective. Sixty percent of U. S. total direct investment in Taiwan
from 1952 to 1974 and nearly one third of all foreign investment went into the
electronics industry, making it the largest industrial recipient of foreign
capital. Gustav Ramis, op. cit., p. 248.
18Ibid., p. 241.
19 Admiral to Build Color TVs in Taiwan, Electronic News,
2 March 1970..
20See statistical appendix.
21 See Growth Tapering Off in U. S. Taiwan Investment, Electronic
News, 16 July 1973.
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LL Robert Che-tong Chen, The Electronics Industry in Taiwan
(unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Santa Clara, 1974),
p. 112.
23
Buyers from U. S. Zero in on Taiwan, Electronic News,
5 June 1972. The stimulus, however, was not strong enough to reverse
the deficit in the TV trade which Taiwan has had with Japan through 1977.
See statistical appendix.
24
Buyers from U. S. Zero in on Taiwan, Electronic News,
5 June 1972.
4b In the early 1960s, Shibura Electrical had technical agreements
with Tatung. Licensing agreements with Kawasaki (calculators), Toshiba
(TVs) and Hitachi (TVs) in the early 1970s allowed it to compete success-
fully in international trade.
26Plan Tatung Brand TV Bow in U. S., "Electronic News, 9 July
1973.
271ITaiwan Output of Calculators for Export Soars, Electronic
News, 11 December 1972.
G Taiwan Manufacturers Eye Low-End Calculator Field,
Electronic News, 15 May 1972.
29"12mn Taiwan IC Project Due for Completion in Two Years,'
Electronic News, 21 June 1976.
30
"Chip Shortages in Taiwan Snag TV Games Entries," Electronic
Production,"Electronic News, 23 January 1978.
31 "U.S. Firms in Taiwan Cutting Output," Electronic News, 25
November 1974.
32 "Taiwan Consumer Prices Stable," Electronic News, 9 December
1974.
33"Taiwan Steps Up Color TV Export Role, Electronic News,
7 November 19 7 7.
News,I Novermber 1977; "Taiwan Gevernment Plant Begins C/MOS chip
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34 Taiwan Fearful of Curbs on TV Exports to U.S., Electronic
News, 13 November 1978 OMA for TV with Taiwan Still on Hold, Elec-.
tronic News, 4 December 1978 Spur U. S. Taiwan TV Talks in Wake of
China Policy, Electronic News, 25 December 1978 Some Taiwan TVs
Ticketed for Japan, Electronic News, 12 February' 1979. An interesting
result of the OMA, which demonstrates the degree to which the Four have
developed their financial, marketing and production flexibility, is the deci-
sion by Admiral Overseas Corporation of Taiwan, a wholly owned subsidiary
of Pan Chow International of Hong Kong, to establish a subsidiary in Kansas
to assemble color TVs so that the company could make full use of its quota
under the OMA. Admiral (Taiwan) Plans U. S. Plant, Electronic News,
3 December 1979.
35See statistical appendix.
36 Hong Kong Consumer Exports to U. S. Increasing, Electronic
News, 12 January 19760
37Figures here refer to traditional consumer electronics products
and were calculated as follows: transistor radios+ (transistor radios+ gramo
phones+ tape recorders+ radios other than transistor+ calculators+ trans-
mitter-receivers+ TVs). In Hong Kong statistics product classification
numbers 724205+ (714202+ 724101+ 724102+ 724205+ 724206+ 724920+
891112+ 891113+ 891114).
38The U. S. continued to be the chief market for radios accounting
for just under half of net exports from 1973-1977. Source: Hong Kong
Trade Statistics.
39The high proportion of sales of parts to Singapore masks Singa
porean re-exports, probably bound for Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand,
and 'other nearby less developed countries.
40 „Hong Kong Exports: Shift from Calculators to Watches,
Electronic News, 5 January 1976.
41 „Trend at Hong Kong Firms Switching Products Quickly,
Electronic News, 20 March 1978.
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.„Hong Kong Toy Firms See MPU Lag Growing as Sales Increase,
Electronic News, 19 November 1979 In Hong Kong, Parts Shortages Pinch-
ing Makers, Electronic News, 19 March 1979 Say Shortages of Parts Crimp
Hong Kong Firms, Electronic News, 7 August 1978.
43 William F. Beazer, The Commercial Future of Hong Kong (New York,
Praeger, 1979), p. 55.
44 Ratios were calculated from Singapore Half Yearly Trade Statistics
as follows: radios, not combined+ (radios, not combined+ calculators+ TVs
+ tape recorders+ record players+ radio tape recorders+ cassette tape re-
corders+ combined units) In Singapore Half-Yearly Trade Statistics product
classification numbers the ratio is (724203+ 724204+ 724205): (714201+
724101+ 724102+ 724202+ 724203+ 724204+ 724205+ 724207+ 891112+
981114+ 891115+ 89116+ 891117).
4-1)Plessey Please, Economist, 236:55 (1 August 1970). In July
1970, Plessey became the last large electronics components plant to slip
in under the old liberal tax write-offs system.
4bSingapore: Cheap Labor is on the Way Out, Business Week,
19 July 1979.
47Ian Little arrives at the same conclusion. Ian Little op. cit.,
p. 464.
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V. The Four's Trade with the OECD
This chapter presents some general observations about the trade
in consumer electronics products between the Four and the developed
countries of the OECD. Highlights of export volumes, growth rates, and
growth periods are given in Table V. 1. Table V.2 presents information
on trade balances of product categories. A detailed presentation of the
OECD trade statistics is given in the appendix.
Calculators l
Export sales of the Four's calculators increased phenomenally from
1971 to 1975, with the Four achieving a 13 percent OECD import market
share by 1975. Since then, their share has dropped to six percent. Similar
peaks were achieved in the Japanese market in 1974 (18%) and in the Euro-
pean 2 market in 1975 (15%). Market penetration into the U. S. still had not
peaked in 1977 (16.8%). As Table V. 2 shows, the Four moved into the cal-
culator industry in lock-step, achieving trade surpluses simultaneously with
Europe (1972), the U. S. (1973) and Japan (1976).
Recent declines in sales volumes indicate market saturation, while
market share declines suggest the unattractiveness to the Four of a low-
profit product whose components, the chips, are in short supply and are
controlled by competitors in the OECD, who are able to achieve significant
65
economies of scale. Recall Table II. 2, which shows the changes in factor
intensities making calculator production more attractive to capital and RD
rich countries. As was noted in the last chapter, Korea and Taiwan are
attempting to develop domestic chip production capabilities to break the
developed countries' technological monopoly. Hong Kong's ability to hold
a constant market share reflects its responsiveness to its overseas markets
Television Sets
Exports of television sets exhibited rapid growth in the early seven-
ties with OECD market share increasing until 1974 and declining thereafter.
The pattern reflects the rush of U. S. firms into offshore production in Tai-
wan, Japanese joint ventures growth in Korea and Taiwan, the growth of
domestic Korean and Taiwanese TV industry, and, to a lesser extent, Euro-
pean offshore ventures in Singapore. Hong Kong has not built up a significant
export capacity in TVs. Taken together, the Four maintained positive trade
balances in TVs throughout the period studied.
The Four's OECD market share peaked at more than 15 percent in
1973 and 1974, with Taiwan accounting for more than three quarters of the
Four's exports. In 1974, the Four held a dramatic 51. 6 percent of the
American market share, but that figure has since dropped to 25 or 30 per-
cent. Taiwan accounted for 90 percent of the Four.'s peak year exports to
the U.S., but just over half of their exports to the U. S. .in 1977.
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Japan's imports of TVs from the Four have been small in absolute
.terms, peaking at $12 million in 1975 compared with U. S. imports the same
year of $166 million. In terms of market share, though, the Four have sup-
plied more than three quarters of Japanese TV imports in recent years.
The Four's share of European imports has never been more than 3. 5 percent,
of which more than half is supplied by Singapore.
The falling off of market share in recent years has been a reflection
of rising wages and government policy shifts away from encouraging elec-
tronics assembly operations. MNCs have elected to seek expansion in other
parts of the world in recent years, leaving existing subsidiaries and domestic
firms to grow at more normal rates.
Effects of the orderly marketing agreements with Japan (in July 1977)
and Korea and Taiwan (June 1979) do not appear in the trade figures3 but their
effects, a short-term rise for Korean and Taiwanese exports in 1978 followed
by a decline in 1979, can be assumed.
Radios
Growth in the radio export industry preceeded 1968 by many years.
The Four's 12 percent OECD import market share, in that first year for
which this study has data, was the product of steady growth throughout the
sixties. By the late sixties and seventies, the export industry showed signs




OECD import market share rose to about 25 percent in 1973 and
has remained constant since then. Hong Kong has supplied consistently
from 10 to 12 percent Of the OECD import market. The Four's penetra-
tion of the U. S. market peaked in 1974 at 38.8 percent, but U. S. losses
in the late seventies have been offset by gains in the European market:
by 1977, the Four accounted for 20 percent of the European import market.
Since 1972, Japan has imported about 90 percent of its radios from
the Four, with Taiwan providing about half, Korea one third, and Hong Kong
about a tenth. Positive trade balances on radios with Europe and the U. S.
have been the rule in the seventies but, with the exception of Taiwan in 1977,
negative trade balances have been the case with Japan.
Tape Recorders and Record Players5
The Four's tape recorders and record players achieved a ten percent
share of the OECD import market in 1976 and 1977, after steady and uninter-
rupted growth over the previous ten years. With Taiwan accounting for two
thirds of their total exports to the U. S., the Four increased its American
import market share to 15 percent. Japan now imports about one third of
these products from the Four, with Korea providing about two thirds of
those imports and Taiwan providing the remaining one third. The Four
have increased steadily their market share in Europe, but by 1977, they
accounted for only six percent of all imports. Singapore played a negligible
role in exporting record players and tape recorders up to 1977, and showed
negative trade balances with both the U. S. and Japan throughout the period.
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Hong Kong was relatively weak throughout the period, with trade balances
turning positive in 1976. Korean and Taiwanese strength showed earlier
(1972 and 1973 respectively) but their- record player and tape recorder
trade with Japan showed deficits throughout the period.











































































































































growth index calculated on the basis of 1970 total= 100
1975 is the last year for which statistics are available
++A year of rapid growth is defined as a year when exports exceeded previous year's exports by more than 30%
Note: For raw data, see statistical appendix.
Taiwan
1968-73
Table V. 2 Trade Balances
The following table summarizes changing trade balances on product cate¬
gories from 1968 to 1977. A+ indicates that the country in question's
exports minus imports have been positive for the entire period, while a
indicates that they have been negative. Where the balance changed
from negative to positive during the period, the number followed by+
indicates the first year of a positive trade balance in that product cate¬
gory. In cases where the balance has shifted positive and then changed
back to negative fluctuating is entered. For raw data, see appendix.

























































































Note: Adjustments have been made to account for the lack of data on U.S.
imports of Taiwanese products in 1972.
*Summarized from OECD SITC 891 (musical instruments, sound recorders
and parts), used instead of 891. 1 (phonographs, tape recorders and other
sound recorders so as to give consistent figures for the whole period from
1968-77. While the distortions produced by the inclusion of musical instru¬
ments are minimal, the inclusion of parts tends to increase deficits.
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Chapter V: Footnotes
Refers to OECD SITC number 714.2, calculating and accounting
machines, etc.
ZThroughout this chapter, I use the term "Europe" to designate
the OECD countries of Europe.
3The possibility exists that the decline in Japanese imports from
1975 may have been caused by increasingly adverse U. S. reactions to
Japanese imports. The Japanese may have moved more into their own
markets, creating market gluts. This' would not be an effect of the OMA,
but it would be a part of the general circumstances which led to the negoti-
ation of the OMA.
4The classification radios contains both top-of-the-line models,
whose sales would be increasing, and cheap transistor radios, whose ex-
port importance would be declining.
5Refers to OECD SITC number 891. 1, phonographs, tape recorders
and other sound recorders, etc. Trade balances regarding these products
are calculated from the higher level of aggregation, 891, musical instru-
ments, sound recorders and parts. Most of 891 is accounted for by 891. 1.
The reason for the change is to provide a consistent statistic for the entire
period. Exports of 891. 1 are not reported for the years 1976-1977.
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General Conclusions
1. The Heckscher-Ohlin factor proportions model, its major
limitations of ignoring the importance of demand aside, is consistent with
the Four's export patterns of consumer electronics goods. The paradox
of wages rising at the same time that consumer electronics goods exports
were rising can be resolved as follows:
a. The period of fastest export growth, from 1968 to 1973
took place before the fastest growth in wages. Moreover, in recent years,
developed country market share of the Four has dropped, reflecting reduced
competitiveness (relative to the early seventies). as one would expect from
their rising wages.
b. Products exported by the Four probably have become
more sophisticated (more skill-intensive) even though they are classified
under the same SITC categories as before.
c. Capital and skill intensive production operations, for-
merly-performed in Japan and the U.S., have moved to the Four, changing
their industries from assembly to integrated production.
d. Some labor intensive assemblies and sub-assemblies
have moved offshore from the Four to more labor abundant, less developed
countries.
2. Vernon's product cycle model is not applicable because the roles
played by the MNCs, licensing and marketing contracts, rapid international
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communications and efficient transportation of parts and finished products
tend to wipe out the importance of international boundries. Product cycles
are violated by the existence of a single international market.
3. The Four share common attributes which favored their develop-
ment of export-led economies in which consumer electronics products have
played a prominent role. Among the most important are:
a. Political stability and social cohesion
b. Elasticity and reliability of labor supplies
c. A cultural predisposition to accept industrial discipline
and technology transfers
d. High degrees of social flexibility
e. Reduction of alternatives to active participation in..
international trade an(!'
f. Sound government policies which stimulated investment
and exports.
4. Although their successes were aided by common experiences,
the Four have exhibited significant differences in their industries' separate
developments.
5. The U. S. has been the largest market for products while Japan
has been the principal supplier of parts as well as finished products for
domestic consumption. With the exception of Singapore, the Four have not
been directed towards the European trade. In recent years, these roles
have been relaxed somewhat. Japan is becoming less important as a parts
supplier and more important as a market. The Four have been diversifying
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into European markets as well.
6. The regional trade between the Four is of little and dimishing.
significance. Although Hong Kong and Taiwan have strong trade links, all
Four (especially Korea) have very strong links with Japan. Singapore,
moreover, has growing ties with the ASEAN nations which outweigh ties
with the Four.
It is natural that such a rambling study as this should lack firm
conclusions. The ones listed above are general, tentative, and in need
of rigorous testing. It is the hope of this writer that the information and
ideas herein expressed will stimulate others to investigate further the
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Explanation of Tables
All four sets of tables follow the general format established in the
first set, the raw import statistics. Tables are arranged by product cate-
gory, following in the numerical order of the SITC number of the product.
Within each product category, tables are arranged by the OECD partner in
the order of total OECD, the U.S.A., Japan and European OECD countries.
Within each table, columns refer to the Four in the order of Hong Kong,
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Rows correspond to consecutive years
starting in 1968 (year 1) and ending in 1977 (year 10). Amounts are in
thousands of U. S. dollars.
Each column can be identified by referring to its column code:
1st character (s): The Operation
exports of the OECD to the Fourx
imports of the OECD from the FourM
fraction of imports into the OECD country (or countries)
MF
accounted for by the Four
trade balance of the Four with the OECD (i. e., OECDPC
imports minus exports)











4th and 5th characters: The Product
SITC no. 714 Office MachinesC1
SITC no. 714.2 Calculating and Accounting Machines, etc,C2
SITC no. 724 Telecommunications ApparatusC3
SITC no. 724. 1 Television Broadcast ReceiversC4
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SITC no. 724.2 Radio Broadcast ReceiversCs
SITC no. 724.92 Microphones, LoadspeakersC6
and' Amplifiers
SITC no. 729.3 Thermionic Valves-and Tubes,C7
Transistors, etc.
SITC no. 891 Musical Instruments and SoundC8
Recorders and Other Sound Recorders.
SITC no. 891.1 Phonographs, Tape RecordersC9
and Other Sound Recorders.
For example, MFSJC4 refers to the proportion of total Japanese.
imports of TVs accounted for by imports of TVs from Singapore.
*In the trade balance section, W is used to designate the
trade balance of the OECD country or countries with the rest
of the world.
**No OECD import data are given for-U.S. imports from Taiwan
in 1972.
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EUROPEAN IMPORTS OF CALCULATORS
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. 1431800+07
. 17 5265E +0 7
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U.S. IMPORTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS-APPARATUS
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102631E+0 7
Note: Year 3 (i.e., 1970) is the first year for which data are available.






































































































































Note: Year 3( i. e., 1970) is the first year for which data are available.
MKJC3
MNEC3
OECD IMPORTS OF TVS
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? 7 A 7 4 R.
1 2 1 4 5
Note: OECD data are not publi shed for years 9 and 10 (i.e., 1976 and 1977). U.S. impo i t
statistics for those years are taken from U.S. General Imports: Schedule A, Ccrramodity
by Country, Washington, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
TADANT TTQT7T ATD (DTT1 QTT I1XT9



























































































































Note: OECD data are not published for years 9 and 10( i.e., 1976 and 1977). Japanese
statistics for those years are taken from The Trade of Japan, Tokyo, Government of
Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
MTEC4 MNEC4
nEf.n IMPORTS OF RADIOS
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TT c IMPORTS of radios
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JAPANESE IMPCRTS OF RADIOS
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EUROPEAN IMPORTS OF RADIOS
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OEGD IMPORTS OF MICS SPEAKERS AND AMPS
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U.S. IMPORTS OF MICS SPEAKERS AND AMPS
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1 2 3 4 5
Note: OECD data are not published for years 1.2,9 and 10 (i.e., 1968,1969, 1976, 1977).
TATDA TMTTQTT Tf MICS.SPEAKERS AND AMPS
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Note: OECD data are not published for years 1, 2, 9, and 10 (i.e., 1968, 1969, 1976, 1977).
OECD IMPORTS OF TUBES AND SEMICONDUCTORS





























































US IMPORTSW OF TUBES AND EMICONDUCTORS
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APANESE IMPORTS OF TUSES AND SEMICONDUCTORS



































































































































OECD IMPORTS OF MUSICAL INSORUMENTS A ND SOUND RECORDERS
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JAPANESE IMPORTS OF MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS AND SOUND RECORDERS
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JAPANESE IMPORTS OF PHONOGRAPHS AND TAPE RFGORnEns
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THE FOURS IMPORTS OF CALCULATORS





















































Note: OECD data not published for years 9 and 10( ie, 1976 and 1977)
THE FOUR'S IMPORTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS apparattp


















































1 2 3 4
Note: OECD data not published for years 1 and 2 (i.e., 1968, 1969)
XNAC1





















































Note: OECD data not published for years 9 and 10( i. e., 1976, 1977)
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Note: OECD data not published for years 1,2,9 and 10 (i. e.. 196£
XNOC4
2
THE FOUR'S IMPORTS OF TJBES AND SEMICONDUCTORS
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THE FOUR'S IMPORTS OF MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS AND SOUND RECORDERS
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Note: OECD data not published for years 9 and 10( i.e., 1976, 1977).
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SHARE OF U.S. IMPORTS OF OFFICE MACHINES
MFNAC1 MFHAC1 MFKAC1 MFSAC1
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SHARE OF JAPANESE IMPORTS OF CALCULATORS
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SHARE OF OECD IMPORTS OF RADIOS
SHARE OF JAPANESE IMPORTS OF RADIOS
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SHARE OF OECD IMPORTS OF MICS SPEAKERS AND AMPS
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SHARE OF EUROPEAN IMPORTS OF TUBES AND SEMICONDUCTORS
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TRADE BALANCES WITH JAPAN IN OFFICE MACHINES
PCWJC or M ir PTH l r
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TRADE BALANCES WITH EUROPE IN OFFICE MACHINES








































































TRADE BALANCES WITH OECD IN CALCU LATORS
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Note: Since, for years 9 and 10, OECD data includes imports, but not exports, the figures for
those vears are OECD imports, not imports minus exports.
TRADE BALANCES WITHJAPAN IN CALCULATORS
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Note: Since, for years 9 and 10, OECD data includes imports, but not exports, the figures for those
years are OECD imports, not imports minus exports.
TRADE RALANCES WITH OECD IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS APPARATUS
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TRADE RA LANCES WITH U.S. IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS APPARATUS
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TRADE BALANCES WITH JAPAN IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
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TRADE BALANCES WITH OECD IN TVS
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Note: Statistics for the U.S. in years 9 and 10( 1976, 1977) in columns 2-5 are U.S.
imports, not imports minus exports.
TRADTT RAT.ANHES WITH JAPAN IN TVS







































































1- 2 -3 -4 5
Note: Trade balances are not given for years 9 and 10. Numbers eriered are Japanese imports.
a i tt T-, A r A KTr-TTC WTTM PTTR f)PE IN TVS
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TRADE BALANCES WITH U.S. IN MICS SPEAKERS ANn AMPS
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TRADE BALAN CES WITH U.S. IN TUBES AND SEMICONDUCTORS
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Note: Since OECD export data are not given for years 9 and 10( i.e., 1976, 1977), while
import data are given, the figures in those rows are import statistics, not imports minus exports.
TRADE BALANCES WITH JAPAN IN PNONOGRAPHS AND TAPE RECORDERS
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Note: Since OECD export data are not given for years 9 and 10( i.e., 1976 and 1977), while
import data are given, the figures in those rows are import statistics, not imports minus exports
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1提
綱
本
研
究
在
描
寫
和
分
析
新
加
坡
，
香
港
，
台
灣
和
南
朝
鮮
四
個
新
近
工
業
化
的
東
亞
國
家
四
國
與
其
他
國
家
之
間
家
庭
用
電
器
品
家
電
品
的
貿
易
。
四
國
在
國
際
貿
易
的
新
近
興
起
，
出
售
越
來
越
高
級
的
產
品
令
世
界
注
目
。
對
已
經
開
發
的
國
家
他
們
一
方
面
以
購
買
者
之
身
份
大
量
買
入
四
國
的
產
品
，
同
時
一
方
面
以
競
爭
者
之
身
份
盡
力
維
持
自
己
的
市
場
。
未
開
發
的
國
家
則
對
四
國
的
成
果
感
到
佩
服
和
引
以
為
學
習
的
榜
樣
。
連
共
產
黨
集
團
中
的
一
些
國
家
也
應
意
向
四
國
的
部
分
經
驗
加
以
研
究
。
在
四
國
經
濟
發
展
中
，
家
電
品
出
品
的
劇
增
一
直
是
令
人
注
2意
的
問
題
之
一
。
雖
然
家
電
品
在
這
些
國
家
經
濟
中
並
不
是
占
最
重
要
地
位
，
但
是
家
電
品
出
口
量
是
超
過
一
般
的
估
計
。
同
時
這
也
引
起
不
少
人
重
視
。
它
們
產
品
的
質
量
是
眾
所
周
知
，
令
人
重
新
考
慮
對
亞
洲
產
品
低
質
的
看
法
。
作
者
希
望
在
這
研
究
中
，
比
較
和
分
析
家
電
品
的
貿
易
，
提
出
它
們
發
展
之
原
因
與
特
質
，
並
且
指
出
四
國
超
進
展
的
一
面
。
本
文
主
要
結
論
有
以
下
六
點
：
一
盡
管
因
素
比
例
模
型
(Hackscher-Chbin
Factors
Properties
A
ll)
有
忽
視
市
場
需
求
一
面
之
缺
點
，
它
與
四
國
出
口
家
電
品
之
情
況
是
一
致
的
。
工
資
與
出
口
量
同
時
上
升
之
問
題
可
用
下
列
觀
念
解
3說
：
a
一
九
六
八
年
至
一
九
七
三
年
最
高
速
度
出
口
成
長
期
發
生
在
工
資
急
升
期
之
前
。
同
時
近
年
來
四
國
在
已
開
發
國
家
市
場
占
有
率
已
下
降
，
正
可
反
映
其
因
工
資
上
升
而
減
低
競
爭
力
。
b
四
國
之
產
品
已
比
以
前
複
雜
，
雖
然
仍
引
用
同
一
產
品
類
別
號
碼
。
C
以
往
在
日
本
，
美
國
使
用
之
資
本
密
集
和
技
術
密
集
之
生
產
作
業
已
引
進
四
國
，
這
今
四
國
家
電
品
行
業
從
裝
配
改
為
一
貫
性
生
產
。
D
一
部
分
勞
工
密
集
的
裝
配
廠
從
四
國
移
到
一
些
勞
動
力
4更
充
足
的
低
發
展
國
家
去
。
二
產
品
生
命
周
期
模
型
在
這
問
題
上
不
適
用
。
這
因
為
跨
國
公
司
，
租
用
商
標
與
代
銷
合
同
，
快
速
的
國
際
郵
電
往
來
，
零
件
與
成
品
的
運
送
使
國
際
間
之
界
限
不
顯
著
。
產
品
周
期
也
因
單
一
國
際
市
場
存
在
而
被
破
壞
。
三
四
國
有
一
些
共
同
特
點
。
這
些
特
點
有
利
於
它
們
以
出
口
為
主
，
帶
動
經
濟
發
展
，
其
中
家
電
品
業
是
相
當
重
要
一
環
。
這
些
特
點
包
括
：
a
政
治
穩
定
和
社
會
團
結
；
b
勞
動
力
之
可
靠
性
和
彈
性
；
3c
有
利
於
吸
收
工
業
紀
律
和
技
術
移
入
的
文
化
基
礎
；
d
高
度
的
社
會
靈
活
性
；
e
除
了
積
極
介
入
國
際
貿
易
外
，
其
他
選
擇
甚
少
；
f
政
府
執
行
有
利
於
投
資
與
出
口
的
正
確
政
策
。
四
雖
然
四
國
的
成
功
有
共
同
的
經
驗
，
但
是
它
們
在
經
濟
發
展
中
有
極
明
顯
的
不
同
點
。
五
以
往
美
國
是
這
些
產
品
的
最
大
買
主
而
日
本
是
主
要
原
料
和
成
品
供
應
來
源
。
除
了
新
加
坡
以
外
其
他
三
國
以
往
沒
有
介
入
歐
洲
市
場
。
近
年
來
情
況
稍
有
改
變
。
日
本
已
不
似
以
前
為
重
要
供
應
來
源
而
較
為
重
要
購
買
者
。
四
國
也
分
散
市
場
到
歐
洲
去
了
6.
六
四
國
之
間
貿
易
並
不
大
，
同
時
還
在
減
少
中
。
只
香
港
和
台
灣
之
間
有
強
大
的
貿
易
關
係
。
四
國
特
別
南
朝
鮮
與
日
本
有
極
大
的
關
聯
。
新
加
坡
與
東
南
亞
協
會
間
的
貿
易
關
係
，
比
對
其
他
三
國
更
大
。


